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Littleton Groom was typical of many prominent Austrahan 
politicians in his attitudes towards the First World War. A non-Labor 
member of the Commonwealth House of Representatives 
throughout the conflict and for part of that time a minister, he 
constantly stressed the moral righteousness of the British Empire's 
cause, with which he equated that of Austrahan nationalism. His 
career between 1914 and 1918 is, nevertheless, worthy of special 
attention for several reasons. He was the only wartime minister who 
had also occupied ministerial office in Alfred Deakin's Liberal 
Protectionist governments of 1905 to 1908 when he was a leading 
spokesman for the 'new liberal' ideology in Australia. He was one of 
the few ministers in power at the outbreak of war in 1914 who also 
held a portfolio when the war ended in 1918. He was one of the very 
few Queenslanders who played an active role in the federal 
parliament throughout the war and was always a leading figure in 
supporting the Ahied cause in his own state. He was involved in most 
of the major war time controversies as well as significant changes in 
non-Labor political organization. He was typical of other politicians. 
His activities and views during the war provide a useful case study 
which assists a wider understanding of significant political and social 
developments. 
Born in Toowoomba, Queensland, in 1867, Littleton Ernest 
Groom was educated there and at the University of Melbourne. After 
practising as a lawyer in Queensland for several years, he was elected 
to the House of Representatives for the Darling Downs constituency 
in 1901. He quickly became noticed as a forceful politician on the 
radical wing of the protectionist party. Between 1905 and 1908, first 
as Minister for Home Affairs, and then as Attorney General, he tried 
to foster 'federal sentiment' through the expansion of 
Commonwealth powers. The 1909 fusion of non-Labor parties 
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presented him with a dilemma but he supported it on the grounds 
that otherwise his party and its principles faced extinction. As 
Minister of External Affairs until April 1910, however, he had greater 
difficulties with many of his new colleagues than with the Labor 
opposition. Yet he still attacked Andrew Fisher's subsequent Labor 
administration as class-biased and irresponsible. Minister for Trade 
and Customs in Joseph Cook's short-lived Liberal government of 
1913-1914, he largely devoted himself to reversing Labor policies but 
was still occasionally able to exhibit his old disregard for parochial 
state interests.' 
In August 1914 Groom received the first rumours of the impending 
War while on pre-election speaking tour in Queensland. Arriving at 
his home in Toowoomba, a series of telegrams from the Prime 
Minister advised him of the rapid course of events. On the ninth 
Cook asked Groom to return to Melbourne at once.2 Although 
Groom publicly hoped that the 'terrible calamity of war may be 
averted', he maintained that 'we all must recognise that the fate of 
the Empire involves the fate of Austraha'.3 
Once in Melbourne he was very soon involved in the government's 
preparations to meet the new circumstances. Despite the 
Commonwealth's undisputed right to assume responsibility for 
Australia's conduct in the War, Cook decided it was desirable to co-
operate with the states and summoned a conference of state premiers 
and federal ministers. It met on 11 August and sat for four days. 
Groom being among those who attended. Relevant to Groom's 
portfolio were the moves announced to control trade by and with 
enemy subjects and the possible 'cornering' of foodstuffs.'* 
THE 1914 ELECTION 
Groom's time as Minister for Trade and Customs was near an end. 
The election was fixed for 5 September and during the next couple 
of weeks he was in his constituency. Despite Labor pleas for a 
postponement of the poll and an all-party government. Groom and 
his colleagues believed the election should go ahead as planned. He 
faced a difficult contest because of the concentration of Germans and 
those of German descent in his electorate,^ one of whom was Paul 
Bauers, his Labor opponent.^ Groom was thus careful in his 
statements on the war. The conflict, he said on 25 August, was ah 
the more painful because it was 'between two nations who had so 
much in common and had done so much to advance the arts, sciences 
and industries of modern civilisation'. Germans in Australia, he 
stated, should continue to receive the respect of their fellow citizens, 
'so that when God in his mercy sent peace, no trace of bitterness 
could exist between them.'^ In a final message to his electors on 5 
September he devoted relatively little attention to the war other than 
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arguing that 'at this critical juncture in our national affairs' it was 
vital the Liberals be returned. Otherwise, he repeated his party's 
policies as Cook first enunciated them and spoke disparagingly of 
'the theories of the socialistic leaders'.* 
Despite his efforts, his personal majority was reduced and Labor 
won a decisive majority in both houses. He received 15,148 votes to 
Bauers' 11,495 and saw the two major centres of Toowoomba and 
Warwick show a preference for Labor."^ Both were once his 
strongholds. Overall, Labor achieved a clear-cut mandate with forty 
two House of Reprepsentative seats compared to thirty two for the 
Liberals and one independent, and thirty one Senate seats compared 
to five for the Liberals.'" 
Although the result disappointed Groom, the loss of the election 
enabled him to espouse openly his views on the war. He quickly 
identified himself as an imperial patriot who rejected as outright 
disloyalty suggestions that Australia was any less involved in the war 
than Britain, France or Belgium and who conceived of no 
meaningful distinction between the interests of Austraha and those 
of the British Empire. He argued that the war was nothing less than 
a fight for the Empire's preservation. Should it go down, and 
Germany become the dominant nation, he warned, 'then God help 
the members of this great country.'" 
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WINNING THE WAR 
His identification of God with the British cause was probably 
strongly influenced by his faith in the principles of the Church of 
England. Most of that body's laity still saw Britain as the 'old 
country' and for all the leading members of its hierarchy it was the 
land of birth, education and training and the preserver of cultural 
and spiritual values. While the imperialism of church members 
received only sporadic attention before 1914, the war brought it to 
new prominence. The contents of wartime Church of England 
periodicals and sermons gave the impression that the propagation of 
patriotism took precedence over ah other tasks. Many articulate 
Anghcans like Groom subordinated everything to the winning of the 
war.'2 
At the same time he saw no conflict between his imperialism and 
Australian nationalism. In May 1916 he wrote to the aihng (Alfred) 
Deakin that 'the policy of the Deakin Government is the policy for 
today'. 'Australian defence—including the Australian navy, a self-
contained Austraha, a self-contained Empire effected by commercial 
preferential treaties: and a closer organic union between the mother 
country and the Dominions', were all, he argued, the outcome of 
measures Deakin's governments had initiated.'3 He often stressed, 
furthermore, that a strong sense of Australian nationhood was a 
necessary and compatible part of the overall nationalist feeling 
needed to win the war. On the first anniversary of the Australian 
landing at Gallipoli, he told a Toowoomba audience that just as the 
pages of British and French history 'glowed with historic glories ... 
Australia could well be pardoned that on this day of days she sought 
to mark it with fitting ceremony in the hope that Anzac Day might 
be perpetuated."On the day', he went on, 'that men of all classes fell 
side by side to sacrifice their lives that the nation might live, there 
arose before their eyes the fact that the nation was the real and vital 
principle to all of them.''"* He was partly responsible for having the 
remains of Major-General Sir William Bridges, the first commander 
of the First Austrahan division who was killed at Gallipoli, interred 
on a hill close to the heart of the proposed new capital city at 
Canberra.'5 
His many contacts with friends, relatives and constituents 
physically involved in the war must have fostered the expression of 
such feelings. Of special impact here was the death in action of no 
less than four of his nephews. Two of his more frequent 
correspondents, Alfred Moon and Will Grant, served overseas, were 
decorated and respectively reached the ranks of Lieutenant-Colonel 
and Brigadier-General, while one of his contemporaries at 
Toowoomba Graham School, Harry Chauvel, ended the war as a 
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Lieutenant-General, a knight and one of Austraha's most celebrated 
commanders. He was sent many letters which spoke of the need for 
Australia to make a greater effort in support of its men so many 
thousands of miles away.'^ 
He did what he could to meet such requests. Much of his time from 
1914 until the end of the war was devoted to the promotion of 
recruiting throughout Australia. Typical of his efforts was a tour he 
made in Victoria in July 1915, during which he addressed meetings 
in Melbourne and rural centres. He spoke to a gathering in Mildura 
which he later estimated as 1,500 out of the town's total population 
of 6,000. In Melbourne he lectured crowds in the streets and even 
spoke at football matches." Later in the year when a recruiting 
march, the 'Dungarees', reached Toowoomba, Groom made sure he 
accompanied it in a prominent position as it made its way into the 
town. He then called on Toowoomba's eligible young men to join the 
column.'* In August of the next year, when unveiling one of the 
many honour boards throughout his electorate, he urged every man 
who could possibly do so to join the forces at once. 'Our ranks', he 
stated, 'would be depleted by the wastage of war, and a call came 
from our brothers in the front hne to fih the vacant places in the 
ranks.''^ In parhament he argued in favour of a great national 
recruiting drive. He predicted in July 1915 that the war would 
continue at least beyond the next winter and declared that a 
systematic scheme of recruiting was needed to secure a steady stream 
of troops for the front.20 
His attitude to the Labor governments of Fisher and Hughes was 
ambivalent. While he had opposed the concept of a political truce 
before the 1914 elections, he completely reversed his stance after 
them. One cynical explanation was that he desired to return to 
ministerial power as soon as possible. He maintained he did not want 
a combined Liberal-Labour cabinet but only a setting aside of 
questions of a 'party ideological character' so that the energies of the 
whole parliament could be combined in the direction of the war,2i 
yet he sternly criticized the government whenever it put forward 
policies not to his own liking. In December 1914, for instance, he 
condemned an increase in the land tax, even though it was intended 
to cover naval and military expenditure.22 In November 1915 he 
criticized the ministry for its lack of consistent development pohcy 
in the Northern Territory.23 He characterized its tariff as ill-
considered,2-* opposed its move to increase the powers of the 
arbitration court25 and accused it of discrimination against rural 
interests.26 Outside parliament he actively, though unsuccessfuhy, 
campaigned against Labor in the 1915 Queensland state election.2^ 
Later in the year he was more effective when he took a leading part 
in his party's effort to capture the Wide Bay electorate after Fisher's 
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retirement as its representative. The Liberal candidate carried the 
seat with a great swing against the government and Groom, one party 
worker wrote, had a 'large share in our important victory'.2* Though 
he said he attacked Labor only to assist it frame measures which 'will 
help make Australia more efficient in this great contest',29 he was not 
nearly as free from prejudice as he cared to admit. 
ADVOCATE FOR CONSCRIPTION 
One very important issue where Groom completely agreed with 
Hughes and some other Labor men was that of conscription for 
overseas military service. The figures showed, he said in May 1916, 
'there has been a shortage, and in spite of all we can do by means 
of recruiting meetings and sergeants, that shortage has not been 
made up.' He continued that, 'After doing recruiting work during the 
past six or seven months in Queensland, I cannot help feeling that 
the system of voluntary service is not leading to equality of sacrifice 
throughout the Commonwealth.'3° The question Australians had to 
ask themselves, he said when speaking of the Military Service 
Referendum Bill of 1916, was, 'Can the Empire, of which we form 
a part, afford to lose the war?' It seemed logical to him that when 
the Empire's existence was at stake the Commonwealth should have 
power to direct the services of its citizens. The surrender of some part 
of individual liberty, he said, was the price a man paid for the 
privileges of the society in which he lived.3' 
He repeated these views in the bitter referendum campaign which 
followed. Hughes declared that he was going into the campaign 'as 
if it were the only thing for which I have lived'32 and Groom shared 
this sentiment. Early in October 1916 he told a Toowoomba audience 
that while it was only intended to extend the existing system for home 
defence to service outside Australia, those who had boasted at 
election time they had established the system of compulsory service 
in Australia, later raised objections to the whole principle of 
compulsion.33 In towns and settlements dotted ah over south 
Queensland Groom called for an affirmative vote and attacked the 
measure's opponents with a bitterness which reflected the tone of the 
national debate. In opening the 'yes' campaign in Brisbane he 
expressed his belief that 'the heart of Austraha would ring true, and 
that on October 28 the Empire would know—as it knew at the 
beginning of the war—that Austraha was in it to the end.' 
Conscription, he went on, had positive social benefits as well. Under 
it 'men would forget that they belonged to a class or section' and 'the 
son of the wealthiest man would fight side by side with the son of 
the poorest.'3^* On the other hand, he later claimed, 'the anti-
conscriptionists appealed to all the weaker senses of human nature, 
the party passions and selfishness, and even the timidity of the 
people.'35 
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There were good grounds for Groom's optimism. All the major 
newspapers urged a 'yes' vote as did five out of the six state 
governments. Only regret that the leader of the campaign was in the 
wrong party dampened enthusiasm among the Liberals. Protestant 
churchmen provided almost unanimous support, with one 
Methodist minister concluding that Jesus would have voted 'yes'.^^ 
The proposal was narrowly defeated. In Queensland only three out 
of the ten federal electorates gave 'yes' a majority and the proposal 
was beaten in the state by 158,051 votes to 144,200.3' A later survey 
of the broad patterns of voting in the referendum concluded that a 
anti-conscription confederation was composed of a majority of 
farmers and pastorahsts, a large majority of urban and rural 
unionists, a minority of the middle class vote and a large minority 
of the soldiers' vote.3* 
In the Darling Downs the figures were 14,561 in favour and 14,286 
against. In common with many other rural areas, a number of 
normally non-Labor farmers, probably affected by the early high 
enlistment of country men and the consequent labour shortage, 
voted 'no'. Although some historians have questioned the national 
importance of the 'farmers'vote'in the referendum, its influence was 
certainly shown in the Darling Downs figures. Usually safe non-
Labor subdivisions such as Clifton, Jondaryan, Killarney and 
Westbrook decisively rejected conscription while Toowoomba and 
Warwick, which favoured Labor in 1914, came out in support of it.39 
The immediate consequence of the defeat was yet another re-
alignment of Australian political parties. Hughes and his pro-
conscription followers left the Labor caucus and formed a minority 
'National Labor' administration.^o The first step towards 
realignment came when the Victorian Referendum Council 
suggested the formation of a 'win the war' party, a combination of 
the Liberals and National Labor men. Groom was present at a 
meeting which resolved to take steps for 'the creation of a new 
national organization to convene Australian war and national 
interests'.'" Right until the actual formation of the National party 
and government on 18 February 1917 many Liberal parliamentarians 
remained suspicious of any sort of alliance.''2 
Groom did not receive a portfolio but was included in the cabinet 
as Assistant Minister for Defence. It was also announced he would 
act as Attorney-General, a post Hughes retained, if the latter went 
to the forthcoming Imperial Conference in London.'•3 Although he 
had suffered a downgrading in ministerial status since last in office, 
he was lucky to be included in the administration at all when so many 
former ministers were not. He was, he telegraphed his wife, 'quite 
safisfied'."" 
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Yet the political scene was still far from placid. A federal election, 
which the government unsuccessfully attempted to postpone, was 
fixed for 5 May and the campaign was fought with great emotional 
fervour. Hughes pointed to his record as wartime Prime Minister and 
called on those who wanted a 'win the war' policy to give him their 
votes. At the same time he declared that his government would make 
no further attempt to introduce conscription unless the military 
situation made another appeal to the people imperative's Tudor, the 
new Labor leader, claimed that while he would conduct the war effort 
'with vigour and determination', his party remained committed to 
voluntary recruitment.'"' 
IN CONFLICT WITH RYAN 
Groom's own re-election was by no means the certainty it had been 
in previous contests. While almost all German-born Australian 
citizens were disenfranchised, their Australian-born descendants and 
relatives were not. In view of his ideas on the war it was hardly 
surprising that most of this group were against him. No less than 
ninety per cent of local Germans, one of his correspondents warned, 
were for Labor and a lot of farmers were still angry with the 
government over its conscription proposals."^ The Queensland labor 
government under T.J. Ryan, moreover, was popular and no major 
spht developed within its ranks over conscription. Groom's Labor 
opponent, John Wilson, previously divisional returning officer for 
the Darling Downs, had, it was generally agreed, a good chance of 
being elected. A confident Brisbane Worker reported on 19 April that 
Wilson 'is winning support everywhre he goes' and 'should have a 
decisive victory over his opponent.'"•* 
In response to the threat Groom made numerous speeches 
throughout his own and nearby electorates. He opened his campaign 
at Toowoomba with the assertion that Labor preferred sectional aims 
to the national safety and its organization shackled it to such an 
extent that the principle of responsible government was at stake. He 
appealed to all shades of opinion 'to realise that serious position of 
the Empire' and urged them to 'lay aside party feelings, and rally to 
the support of the National War Government'.'''' In the next few 
weeks he repeated his message in support of his own and the 
government's re-election. 
Some idea of the reception he received can be gained from the 
report of the Brisbane Courier on a speech he made in Brisbane on 
18 April. From the outset, it recorded, he was 'assailed by a chorus 
of catcalls, hoots and cries that blended into an amorphous 
unrecognisable clamour'. Two people had to be removed from the 
hall and a woman, 'amid a storm of execration, offered a knitted sock 
to two or three of the Caucus brigade who were making a 
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considerable noise.' For nearly one and a half hours Groom shouted 
back at the chorus. Taking up some of the interjections, he said he 
was the minister who drafted the old age pensions legislation, the 
Barton government passed the one man one vote principle. White 
Australia was a principle in Queensland before Labor was in politics, 
and that the Deakin government sent the cable which initiated the 
Australian navy. To each of his points came the shout of 'liar' from 
the audience. He concluded what was described as 'one of the 
greatest fighting speeches delivered in the hall for many years' with 
some 'biting sarcasm about the lovers of freedom of speech that he 
had found in the Caucus party in Brisbane.'5" 
Groom won handsomely, his vote being 17,815 against Wilson's 
13,937;5' some felt he did well to win at all. 'Down here', the editor 
of a Melbourne magazine wrote, 'it was quite expected you would 
have a very close fight, and might not even have polled as many votes 
as your opponent.'" 'In my opinion', wrote a Nationalist member of 
the Queensland Legislative Assembly, 'you turned, what appeared to 
almost certain defeat, into victory, by your wonderful energy, ability 
and plucky fight.'^3 In the rest of the country the government's 
victory far exceeded any expectations, the Nationalists won fifty 
three seats to Labor's twenty two, including two gains in Queensland, 
and all eighteen Senate vacancies.^4 The verdict clearly demonstrated 
to Groom 'that the spirit of Nationalism was strong within the 
people'55 and that the latter had positively endorsed the government's 
request that 'party programmes and sectional aims might yield place 
to national and Imperial purposes.'^^ 
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After the election Groom was at last able to give some attention 
to his ministerial duties. As Assistant Minister for Defence until the 
end of the year he shared the administrative duties of his department, 
answered questions relating to it in the House of Representatives and 
steered a number of legislative measures through that chamber. 
From 16 November 1917 he was also Vice-President of the Executive 
Council which involved his chairmanship of Executive Council 
meetings in the Governor-General's absence. 
The re-emergence of the conscription issue soon disrupted his 
stable pattern of ministerial life. As it had in 1916, the Western Front 
exploded and the Australian forces lost some 55,000 men killed and 
wounded in the battles at Messines, Bullecourt and Ypres. Despite 
the use- of a variety of inducements, the monthly number of new 
recruits continued to decline. Hughes once more decided to go to the 
people on the conscription question, the pohing date being 
20 December." 
Groom was closely involved in an episode which revealed how 
much he and his associates had espoused authoritarian attitudes. It 
began when on 18 November Ryan, the Queensland Premier, 
questioned the federal ministry's estimates of the numbers needed for 
the AIF's reinforcement and claimed, on the basis of official 
statements, that 109,000 men were readily available.5* Whether 
because of the obvious danger of the calculation or in order to hobble 
the anti-conscription cause, Hughes added a regulation to the War 
Precautions Act on 19 November just as Ryan was to address a major 
rally in Brisbane. It provided that a person who made any false 
statement of fact likely to affect the judgement of the electors, would 
be required to appear in court within forty eight hours of the service 
of the summons.s"* Ryan was not deterred and used his figure of 
109,000 to emphasize how the federal government had misled the 
people.*'" 
Next day Groom replied to the Premier's accusations yet did not 
deny the accuracy of the assessment of the number of men available 
for reinforcements.''' In a letter to the Brisbane Daily Mail on the day 
after the report of his speech he asserted there were at least 100,000 
men available but emphasized that many of these were in training 
and that if reinforcements were not sent and casualties continued 
there would be no reserves in eighteen months. His estimation of the 
time during which the 100,000 mentioned would be available was, in 
fact, more generous than Ryan's original figure prophecy of twelve 
to sixteen months.''2 
Groom's efforts seemed unnecessary as the censorship authorities 
cut the important figures out of the newspaper reports on Ryan's 
address. His reported speech now suggested not opposition to, but 
support for conscription. On learning of the censor's actions Ryan 
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issued a press statement indicating that his speech had been censored 
in the interests of the conscriptionists. He further pointed out that 
Groom was allowed to reply to his analysis of the numbers available 
even though these were not to be published. The censors refused to 
allow this statement to be printed in the pres's, whereupon he decided 
to repeat the significant parts of his speech in the Legislative 
Assembly.''3 On 26 November Hughes personally directed that the 
Premier's remarks be deleted from the state's printed parliamentary 
debates and then also ordered the censorship of a special issue of the 
Queensland Government Gazette which also contained them.'"' On 
30 November it was announced that a summons would be served on 
Ryan for making a false statement likely to affect the judgement of 
the electors and for conspiring to distribute in the state Hansard a 
matter not first submitted to and approved by the censor.^^ j ^ e trial 
opened on 3 December. In many respects the case concluded when 
Ryan's counsel, N.W. Macrossan, cross-examined the first witness. 
Captain C. Wood, the censor who made the original cuts in the report 
of Ryan's speech. Wood argued that Ryan's arithmetic was correct. 
Laughter rippled through the court when he also concurred that 
Groom should be prosecuted as well. He felt, in fact. Groom's claim 
that reinforcements would last for eighteen months was more 
extravagent than Ryan's twelve to sixteen months. After such an 
argument it was not unexpected that the magistrate rejected the 
Commonwealth's case.''^ 
Despite the embarrassment the incident should have caused him. 
Groom's zeal in campaigning for a 'yes' vote was undampened. There 
were, he told a Brisbane meeting, only two real choices—to be for 
or against the German military classes.''^ The proposition for all 
those who loved their country and were loyal to the Empire, he said 
a day later, was whether 'our nation is going to exist, or is it going 
to pass under foreign domination?'^* 
The rowdiness with which anti-conscriptionists often received 
Groom and other pro-conscription speakers exacerbated the 
emotional tone of such statements. A number of meetings in the 
Darling Downs were disrupted and on 29 November, in a now almost 
legendary incident, hostile demonstrators met Hughes at Warwick 
railway station, where he was jostled and hit by a flying egg.''^ Five 
days later Groom could scarcely make himself heard at nearby 
Pittsworth above the booing and shouting audience. 'To all intents 
and purposes', it was reported, 'mob rule prevailed, and the meeting 
was the worst yet held in the town.'^" 
The government's hopes of carrying the referendum were not 
realized. In Queensland all Groom's efforts were nullified when only 
one electorate supported his call. In the Darling Downs the 1916 
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narrow verdict in favour of conscription was reversed to a 'no' 
majority of six hundred and seventeen votes.'' 
Though the result did not, as some hoped, destroy the federal 
ministry, it ended whatever remained of a common national desire 
to win the war. 
AN INFLUENCE ON HUGHES 
During the next year even Groom, in his role as Vice-President of 
the Executive Council, found the Prime Minister's impetuosity 
unacceptable. Always sticklers for legal forms. Groom and the 
Governor-General, Sir Ronald Munro-Ferguson, for whom he 
acted, resisted what they saw as the incorrect manner in which 
Hughes conducted Executive Council meetings. For some time 
irregularities in this connection had annoyed Munro-Ferguson and 
he finally drew up a memo, which the cabinet accepted, setting out 
the correct procedure.'2 j ^ g change was successful, he conceded in 
a private letter, because of Groom's determination 'that business 
which has not been before Cabinet shall not go up to the Executive— 
a precaution which seems to be required but has not hitherto been 
observed.'^3 When, on 27 March 1918, Hughes made Groom 
Minister for Works and Railways in a cabinet reconstruction, 
Munro-Ferguson was clearly unhappy. He took occasion, he 
informed the Colonial Secretary in London, 'to express to the Prime 
Minister my appreciation of Mr Groom's qualifications for the Vice-
Presidency and my regret that he has been transferred from the 
position without the matter being brought to my knowledge.' Hughes 
in reply, 'while recognising how advantageous it would be to retain 
Mr Groom as Vice-President, declared that he was the only man 
available to succeed Mr Watt and expatiated on his difficulties in 
reconstituting his cabinet.'''' At much the same time the Governor-
General directed his official secretary to approach Groom while on 
a train journey to Melbourne and convey to him Munro-Ferguson's 
anxiety as 'to the maintenance of the conditions which were recently 
laid down under which meetings of the Executive Council should be 
held during Your Excellency's absence from the Seat of 
Government.' In the discussion which ensued Groom promised he 
would fully discuss the matter with Senator E.J. Russell, the new 
Vice-President, would call upon the Governor-General privately to 
explain what he had done.'' 
On most other matters Groom wholeheartedly supported Hughes. 
The two men had been on relatively friendly terms since the days of 
the 1904 Liberal-Labor alliance and Hughes later claimed to have 
always had a high regard for Groom.'^ Because of the distrust 
between Hughes and many other former Liberals, Groom quickly be 
came one of his close advisers. Hughes not only appointed him to 
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the important Works and Railways portfolio but made him acting 
Attorney-General during his own long absence overseas during much 
of 1918 and 1919. Groom, in turn, fully supported his leader's ideas 
on the prosecution of the war and tried to emulate him in this sphere. 
He was particularly pleased with Hughes' acceptance of his long 
held dream of a Commonweahh agricultural research organization. 
Despite the war's generally disastrous effect on progressive 
innovations, it had clearly revealed the necessity for planned action 
in primary industry. In 1916 conferences of state agriculture 
ministers, scientists and leading businessmen resulted in a proposal 
for an Institute of Science and Industry to co-ordinate research work 
on primary industries and tackle their problems on a national scale." 
At the May 1918 premiers' conference where Groom and Watt, the 
acting Prime Minister, represented the Commonwealth, the state 
leaders argued this was a Commonwealth intrusion into their 
domain. It took forceful speeches from Groom and Watt showing its 
main benefits to persuade the Premiers reluctantly to agree with 
them.'* After much preliminary investigation, a Director of the 
Institute was appointed later in the year. In late 1918 Groom had the 
satisfaction of moving the second reading of the bill which definitely 
established the Institute,''' and of defending in parliament the 
proposal in the 1918 estimates for the provision of laboratories and 
research equipment.*" 
As acting Attorney-General he was also responsible for the 
maintenance of a considerable number of special wartime laws and 
regulations which invaded almost every sphere of national hfe. While 
his task was largely routine, it again provided evidence of 
authoritarian views. One of the more striking instances occurred in 
May 1918 when he responded to a complaint made by Tudor to Watt 
about the various restrictions then in force.*' Groom, who drafted 
Watt's reply, wrote that while the government appreciated the value 
of free discussion, the right of pubhc meetings, and freedom of the 
press, in time of war rights recognized in peace were 'necessarily 
subject to certain limitations in the national interest'. Not only, he 
continued, did he support those limitations already in force, but also 
further restrictions in the area of the prohibition of material 
prejudicial to recruiting.*2 
While in the war's closing months it was increasingly evident that 
Germany's chances of victory were shght and the British Empire had 
little to fear. Groom continued to argue that the national war effort 
must dominate aU else in Austraha. Although, he said in August 
1918, the tide was turning in the Allies' favour, there were 'greater 
reasons now than in 1914 for wanting to carry [the war], to a 
victorious issue'. He claimed the United States were fighting because 
they knew that if the Allies did not win the future of democracy in 
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the civilized world would be threatened, 'We must say to the 
Germans', he said,'. . . "Get back to Germany, and then we will talk 
peace with you". The home defence of the United States', he went 
on, 'was on the fields of Flanders and France and so is the home 
defence of Australia.'*3 
Groom and most other politicians all too clearly realized a deep 
division had been revealed in Austrahan life since 1914. Only half of 
those eligible had joined the AIF during the war, so that by 1918, 
willingly or not, a considerable proportion of Austrahans stood 
apart from the remainder. Before the war Groom had shared some 
common ideological ground with those radical nationalists who led 
the drive for a social paradise in Austraha. But, as Bill Gammage has 
forcefully argued, by the 1916 conscription referendum the cohesion 
and confidence which gave impetus to the pre-war social welfare 
ideals were gone, and political leaders like Groom were caught 
between the increasingly discordant claims of the nation as they 
conceived it and the Empire. The non-Labour forces, which between 
1910 and 1914 had exerted a tenuous influence on Australian national 
pohtics, were united and given purpose by the war because victory 
and the Empire were causes to which they could dedicate themselves 
without reservation. The National Party thus expressed not only the 
ideals of the conservatives but those of people who before 1914 were 
radical in their aspirations. While the war split society in one sense, 
in another it allowed politicians like Groom to take firm possession 
of the spirit of Australian nationhood and maintain an influence for 
a long period into the future.*' 
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